Dmytro Lakishyk. Bipolarity effect on formation and development US european policy.

The article examines the formation and development of European policy in the era of bipolarity of the USA. It is proved, that at the beginning of the Cold War, during its phases, i.e. in the context of the developments and implementations doctrines and strategies of interventionist nature, in the US foreign policy there was a growing trend of constant participation in international processes. The transition from a policy of containment – Soviet Union, Germany and Japan – to the strategies of liberation and global responsibility has led to a few basic differences between Europeans and Americans. It was a new manifestation and the first formalization of the fundamental reasons for the growing wariness of Europeans regarding American interventionism and globalism. This is the apparent reluctance of the European Community to participate again in the Great Wars and interventionist adventures. Having taken the path of regional integration, the Europeans saw it as an opportunity to end all wars with European countries and their participation in armed conflicts. Unlike the United States, military intervention abroad considered in Europe a relic of the past, historical vestige.

It is analyzed that during the Cold War different options of American interventionism taking into account the position of European allies of the USA were formed. That is, in the era of the Cold War dominated the practical implementation of the principle of political interdependence of the USA and European countries.


Keywords: the USA, Europe, the USSR, the Cold war, bipolarity, interventionism.


With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations as a fundamental and essential principle of the era of globalization has undergone significant changes. The United States began to behave as hegemon in the international arena because of the victory in the Cold War.

Objectivity changing nature of globalization and temporary reduction in the Efficiency of the factor of interdependence associated with the elimination of systemic confrontation between Soviet-style socialism and capitalism Euro-American quality capitalism. Because, first of all, this confrontation included a very high possibility of a global military conflict that constantly affected the use and limitations of the effectiveness of American interventionism [1, p.2–4].

Meanwhile, almost all international political doctrines and strategies of the United States post-war era were formed on the basis of such a possibility and were oriented to prevent a devastating war with the Soviet Union. Under such conditions, military interventionism could be only selective and was conditioned by severe circumstances. Each time it had to be taken into account the implications for US national security at that time mainly in military and political sense.

The purpose of the article – to present evolution of international political doctrine and strategy of interventionism in the European dimension of USA geopolitics.

Equally important is the issue features of postwar evolution of international doctrines and strategies of the United States. The doctrines of containment and liberation that certain modifications in parallel with the US administration used virtually throughout the period of Cold war, were relatively passive, mainly because they were based on the principles of preventing Soviet influence in the western areas of responsibility. The principle of interventionism manifested mainly in the form of response to the Soviet intervention. Almost any interventionist action of Americans at that time was impossible without its arguments by Soviet threat [2, p.1].

However, the doctrine of liberation relatively clearly defined key object of American interventionism – “peoples enslaved by communism”. But it is in this the limited military interventionism reached its highest point. It was shown that it was mainly about peoples and the states, which were under Soviet influence after World War II, or could replenish their list due to “the insidious actions of Moscow”. In the first case military interventionism was not used because Soviet republics formally were generally beyond officially declared by Washington immediate objects of direct intervention.

Hence it follows pivotal idea of American interventionism against the Soviet Union – the political-ideological and propaganda impact on citizens and attempts to blur the stability of the political regime. Despite the US involvement in the Korean and Vietnam wars, interventionism remained limited, which, in particular, manifested in a rather restrained response of official Washington to Berlin crisis and the anti-communist riots in Hungary.

Amid parallel application defined doctrines we consider Euro-American debate of 1950s on FRG rearmament 3, р.511–549. Immediately it should be noted that the first contested that rearmament was official Paris, who insisted on maintaining the status of West Germany subordination to Western allies. Following the centuries-old experience of the German-French wars, French leaders expressed sincere concerns about the possibility of recovery of the German threat in the form of interventionism aimed at the reunification of Germany. In this, French leaders saw the prospect of Germany’s inclusion in post-war structure of power balance, which was not included in the Strategic Plan of Paris as opposed to the intentions of Washington [4, p.813–814].

Thus, already six years after the Second World War, the first French side expressed its special position on US plans, namely to attach West Germany to the implementation of US interests in the doctrine of deterrence. The peculiarity of the French position, which is to some extent preserved to the present times, was that members of the transatlantic alliance in building a defense initiatives and programs should be guided by the principles of equality and multilateralism. In addition, France had already put forward the idea of the European Defense Community, in which German troops would become its component.

In contrast to France, American administration was firmly convinced that only NATO, in which US had the greatest impact, should remain the only transatlantic defense structure. The decision of the US National Security Council for № 160/1 of 17 August 1953 the United States tried to avoid contradictions with France in a way that allowed them to maintain the unity of the transatlantic alliance in implementing the ideology of deterrence. The resolution noted that the integration of Germany into the European community (in this place the term “defense” was removed from the text) will attract German potential to strengthen Europe without the appearance of additional threats to the common security of the West.

The term “defense” concerning the European Community appears in the document only where it comes directly to the concept of security. Also in favor of the French side the US National Security Council included in the text of words about integration as a form of counter revival of German militarism [5, p.514]. Although this option seems didn’t entirely satisfy France. French National Assembly after the failure of the idea of European defense community voted for adoption of Germany to NATO and involvement of the German armed contingents to the operations of the North Atlantic Treaty [6, p.1–15].

Most US foreign policy documents of that period directly or indirectly permeated the idea of expediency of American influence in NATO on the basis of American responsibility for the unity of transatlantic community. However, the attempts that were made, were balanced. Stating understanding of French fears, the US defense department voted for compensation potential revival of the dominant role of Germany in the united Europe by strengthening the Euro-American relations [7, p.522].

As for West Germany, throughout the period of Cold war the events conditioned its relatively minor role. Taking part in the development and adoption of international political decisions, Germany, in most cases remained outside the framework of the military component. For a long time this feature was designated for restraint German positions even in cases where certain displays of American interventionism clearly contradicted the official approaches of Bonn.

In the context of contemporary traditional approaches to international and national security clearly fits the general configuration of forces in the world, where the key role was played by relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. So natural is the fact of primacy of NATO in the negotiations between Western Europe and the USA. The US side justified this approach by twin principle of containment of the USSR temptation to spread communist influence and plant pro-Soviet regimes in areas of western influence and western Germany – from attempts to revive revanchism.

This dual containment remains a key element of all American international political doctrines and strategies up to the second term of Ronald Reagan’s presidency Thus, along with the anti-communist and anti-Soviet content they included a deterrent Germany in full compliance with the positions of the majority of European member states of the former anti-fascist alliance.

It is also important to point to another regularity in the context of effects of Cold War era on contemporary Euro-American relations. It was formed in difficult times of 1950’s and it was in transition of the leadership of the US from interventionist rhetoric and aggressive diplomacy to direct inclusion in military adventures abroad (Korean and Vietnam War).

A special role should be given to the administration of Eisenhower during his second presidency. The fact that in 1959 this president with the support of Congress did utmost to provide anti-communism in the USA total dimension through its distribution to facilitate the release of the Soviet republics of control of Moscow. The adoption in summer 1959 by the US Congress the resolution on Captive Nations Week for the first time in American political history marked the transition to the real (not limited geographically) strategies of global responsibility.

In its framework a significant place is given to Europe, but again it has a wider geopolitical context. After the liberation of oppressed peoples communism necessarily included practical assistance to state sovereignty of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe.

Regarding foreign policy paradigm of John. F. Kennedy’s Administration, it was largely focused on defending the Latin American continent from the communist threat. This was done primarily through the so-called economic interventionism. For example, only on programs of economic development of the continent in the name [8, p.105–122]. However, of progress the United States allocated about $ 20 billion John. F. Kennedy owned definitely a huge role in further modification of the model of American interventionist foreign policy, presidential approval which began in October 1961 by the presidential approval of the plans to seize Cuba for its liberation from communist regime. By putting his signature to the plan of secret operations Mongoose, John. F. Kennedy reaffirmed this intention.

International political doctrine of Nixon-Ford aimed at achieving detente in relations with the USSR and Communist China, in this sense, is a minor exception that only emphasizes the general rule. Because, firstly, the discharge did not object or containment of Soviet ambitions in the “Third World” or the gradual erosion of the Soviet political system. Nixon and his successor in the presidency have only a temporary, amendment, which was hoping that the détente will make the Soviet Union more open to the world community of nations and, regardless of political interventionism of era of containment and liberation will cause erosion of the communist system and democratization of society relations.

It should also be noted that a significant lever of adjusting the US European policy in the era of Truman and Eisenhower had nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. The so-called “atomic diplomacy” of the United States, based on fear of mutual destruction, contributed most decisive convergence of positions of the Americans and Europeans in dealing with the Soviet Union and China. However, it should be borne in mind another important point, namely the US side most of the decisions in this field took on their own, accumulating a huge nuclear capacity without much coordination with its European allies [9, р.7–21].

The author shares the view of Western scholars who stress that it is the giant US efforts towards ensuring their own advantages in the global armaments, along with a declaration of plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe contributed to the key shift not only in the nature of Soviet-American relations, but also relations with US France in the context of the new momentum alertness of Paris to Germany [10, p.50–91]. Violation of the strategic balance in nuclear weapons in Europe affected the position of the Europeans in understanding that at political and mass consciousness accumulated negativity about the so-called “American world”.

On the other hand, it must be taken into account mutual military-strategic and economic factors, on which base their approaches corporatist representatives of the school, which occupies an important place in the historical and political studies. The most prominent representative of it is considered M. Hogan, who defends this so-called “interpretative model” research. He definitely used it to analyze the international political motives of occurrence and effects of the Marshall Plan. M. Hogan believed that the plan was not only a reaction to the Communist threat to Europe or the global Soviet expansionism but also part of the American plan for the restructuring of international economic relations. In fact, one could argue that the researcher saw in the relevant US plans and intentions the attempt to “denationalize” this area of intergovernmental co-existence and cooperation by their corporatization [11, p.2–3.

This approach was perceived by part of European business as a program of subordination of the world, including European, economy to the American corporations. Accordingly, it was another reason for the gradual accumulation of elements of anti-Americanism. We emphasize that the American M. Hogan did not touch the very aspect, as an attempt to explain the causes of appearance in the Truman administration the idea of a new economic order. This is understandable, since M. Hogan a classical historian, who in this case did not go beyond the elementary representation of facts and events, the content of public documents, resolutions, decrees and laws.

However, it was M. Hogan who probably mechanically attracted methods of geopolitics, which provide analysis primacy of primary sources, became one of the first to point to the integration context the Marshall Plan, which, he said, saw European integration as a way to harmonize economic recovery of West Germany with the French caution security nature. Yet for the founder of scientific corporatist school primary importance was such a part of the Marshall Plan as a joint Euro-American deterrence of the Soviet Union [11, p.32].

Thus M. Hogan and his supporters of political thought have provided a little new meaning for double containment. In their view, should not reduce fears of German revanchism only to France’s position, since the same approach is shared by most Americans. They argue that Harry Truman in his plan of a new economic order was guided not providing the benefits of total US in the world economy, but such a purpose as preventing the revival of German militarism. Singled out the fact that in the era of bipolarity American political thought sought to reconciliation with France as a key opponent in the further development of interventionist principles in US foreign policy. And at official level in the United States everything possible was done to prevent the alienation of the French state.

Another important comparative point is contemplated that practically in all its actions the American foreign policy establishment of the Cold war era found full understanding and support from London. In this sense, it seems logical to use by some political scientists term “US-British effort” when to attempt a final “reconciliation” of the Germans, including preventing their economic conflict with the French, as it happened in the interwar period, when there was a real conflict on the property of Ruhr carboniferous.

Thus, in the midst of Cold war there were two key vector events that undoubtedly influenced the future relations between the EU and the USA. This is the US-British cooperation, which gradually acquired signs of implementation of a common foreign policy, and mainly psychological Franco-German rivalry that grew into French wariness regarding the logic of US German policy.

We must pay tribute to postwar American political experts and public figures who immediately after the war recognized the prospect of various kinds of splits among its European allies and began to look for the best models and forms of consolidation. A few years after the war it became clear that the official Washington preferred to ensure organizational implementation of European integrity through even American economic, financial and technical assistance under the Marshall Plan and the creation of a single military-political bloc under the aegis of the United States.

For these reasons, the author does not share the popular in world political thought of early 1990’s thesis that the Marshall Plan was formed immediately as a purely economic integration project [12]. It would be argued that to this approach contributed the implementation of the plan itself against the backdrop of sporadic outbreaks of Franco-German differences and, most importantly, in the context of increasingly rigid system of confrontation along the axis of “East-West”, which skillfully used the American side to consolidate Europe and America.

Within a few years after the deployment of the “cold war” it became clear that the United States essentially drive it at serious support from Western Europeans. Outlined above conflicts and contradictions did not go to the level of the basic contradictions and conflicts. To these European actors refer not only the great powers of the continent, but also medium and small countries that sought protection for themselves from the Soviet threat in the form of inclusion in the US strategy of containment.

The author does not share the unconditional statements of representatives of corporatist scientific school, which almost all the objectives and actions of the United States exasperated with economic pragmatism. It is in times of Cold war was impossible, firstly because of the presence of old and new opponents and various external requirements to the US within anti-colonial movements, and secondly, for the reason that Americans saw the Soviet threat as something entirely concrete and serious, not only in the so-called communist influence in various regions of the world, but also directly in the sense of real danger to the state.

Equally important is seen the fact that, since the Eisenhower presidency, the US administration began to take care of the problem of international prestige and political image of the country that cannot be explained only by economic interests. Because authority was needed for strengthening anti-communist coalition and giving it global proportions that fit completely in the need for mass distribution of counter–response by Soviet propaganda of anti-American slogans.

Note also that the American political thought of the time proved public establishment that confidence in the US within the country and among its foreign allies not less than economic power efficiency can provide effectiveness to the policy of deterrence, multilateral diplomacy and crisis resolution [13, p.2].

However, it is also needed to consider the duality. This implies that trust in America directly corresponds to its economic interests. It is an axiom that cannot be defined within the corporatist school as an axiom is a correlation between the level of confidence and the ability to receive real allies in the case of really serious conflict with the USSR. Only geopolitical approach [14, p.3–29] in this case allows a realistic answer to the extremely high and consolidated the axis “state – society” level of aspirations of the American public and political establishment to join holistic support of its European allies regarding interventionist policy.

Meanwhile, so-called traditionalist (analysis of processes and events as empirical basis for the analysis), realistic (in the sense of the rule of state interests), corporatist (superior economic calculation) and the world-system (in the context of often biased representation of some masked US plans to create a world government under its direct control) political science schools give one-sided picture of the events and do not reach the level of analysis underlying intentions and motives of American behavior in the bipolar world. In fact, the real interest of the United States truly was to eliminate the threats of totalitarianism and authoritarianism presented in the context of real Soviet threat. To understand the deep essence of this approach is possible only with the awareness of the complex geopolitics of the US bases. They enable playing real picture of European politics USA, which aimed to provide support from the US allies in the implementation democratizing impacts on individual countries and international relations.

Thus, the current global democratization strategy is partly rooted in the anti- communism before Reagan’s presidency. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the doctrine of containment and liberation, global responsibility and global human rights imbued with cross-cutting idea that is democratizing impact on other states. All this, according to scientists, largely causes global restructuring in contemporary international relations [15, p.11–13]. With some fate convention could even argue that it is partly initiated by the Soviet Union and partly by the West Cold War with their inherent political-systemic opposition forced the United States to save interventionist approach to foreign policy after World War II and gradually contributed to shifting the basic element of Constitution and Declaration of Independence, which is democracy in international activities.

Thus, during the Cold War gradually formed different American interventionism options taking into account European allies positions. Interventionist American foreign policy of the time, unlike post bipolarity era, was built in a way to have strong support from Western Europe. A key principle determines the practical realization of political interdependence of transatlantic axis states. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to drastic changes in the content of American interventionism that acquired signs of independent decision-making by Washington and their implementation [16, p.4–21]. It is clear that this situation had naturally acquired characteristics of crisis. This required only the specific situation.


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