Bipolarity effect on formation and development US european policy

Dmytro Lakishyk

Ph. D. (History), senior transatlantic fellow of the Institute of World History NAS

UDС 327.5(4+73)

DOI: http://doi.org/10.17721/2524-048X.2015.01.29-42

The article examines the formation and development of European policy in the era of bipolarity of the USA. It is proved, that at the beginning of the Cold War, during its phases, i.e. in the context of the developments and implementations doctrines and strategies of interventionist nature, in the US foreign policy there was a growing trend of constant participation in international processes. The transition from a policy of containment – Soviet Union, Germany and Japan – to the strategies of liberation and global responsibility has led to a few basic differences between Europeans and Americans. It was a new manifestation and the first formalization of the fundamental reasons for the growing wariness of Europeans regarding American interventionism and globalism. This is the apparent reluctance of the European Community to participate again in the Great Wars and interventionist adventures. Having taken the path of regional integration, the Europeans saw it as an opportunity to end all wars with European countries and their participation in armed conflicts. Unlike the United States, military intervention abroad considered in Europe a relic of the past, historical vestige. It is analyzed that during the Cold War different options of American interventionism taking into account the position of European allies of the USA were formed. That is, in the era of the Cold War dominated the practical implementation of the principle of political interdependence of the USA and European countries

Keywords

The USA, Europe, the USSR, the Cold war, bipolarity, interventionism.

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