DEBALTSEVE OPERATION AND MINSK-2 COMPLETION OF THE ACTIVE PHASE OF THE WAR

Ruslan Kavatsiuk,

Ph.D. student,

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2524-048X.2026.35.4 

 

Abstract. The purpose of the article is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the military operations in the Debaltseve area in February 2015, the diplomatic negotiations in Minsk, and the information campaigns accompanying these processes within the broader context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Methodology. The methodological framework of the study is based on the principles of a systemic and interdisciplinary approach, which allows for a holistic understanding of the interaction between military, political, and informational dimensions of the conflict. The research employs methods of comparative analysis, content analysis of media materials, and chronological comparison of key events. The source base includes official documents, materials of state institutions, media content, and testimonies of direct participants in the events, which ensures the reliability and representativeness of the findings. Scientific novelty. The scientific novelty lies in the comprehensive examination of the synchronization of military, diplomatic, and informational instruments during the Debaltseve operation as a crucial episode of the final stage of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2015. The study substantiates the independent and significant role of the informational dimension of the conflict, demonstrating its influence on strategic decision-making processes, the transformation of public discourse, and the shaping of international perception.

Conclusions. It has been established that the interaction of military pressure, diplomatic tools, and information-psychological operations became a decisive factor in shaping the conditions for the Minsk Agreements II and contributed to the subsequent stabilization of the line of contact. The research proves that the informational component of the conflict functioned as an autonomous and influential element, affecting public opinion, political decision-making, and the internal political situation in Ukraine. The results obtained can be used for further studies of hybrid conflicts, as well as for improving strategic communication mechanisms in the field of national security and international relations.

Key words: Debaltseve, Minsk-2, hybrid warfare, information operations, Russian-Ukrainian war, negotiations.

 

Submitted 10.01.2026


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