DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2524-048X.2025.32.10

 

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of the U.S.–British cooperation on the formation of the U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1946–1949, particularly through the examination of the conceptual foundations and key manifestations of military-political and economic collaboration.

Methodology. This empirical study is based on the critical analysis of U.S. and U.K. diplomatic documents from 1946–1949, speeches by political leaders (H. Truman, W. Churchill, E. Bevin, G. Marshall), official reports, and memoirs. The subject of the study is explored within the context of major events in postwar international politics — the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Blockade, and the creation of NATO.

Scientific novelty. The research offers a comprehensive re-evaluation of the U.S.–British cooperation as a decisive factor in shaping U.S. foreign policy strategy in 1946–1949. By tracing the dynamics of political decision-making and the interdependence of American and British initiatives, the article emphasizes Britain’s role as a catalyst that prompted the United States to move toward leadership within the emerging system of collective security.

Conclusions. U.S.–British cooperation between 1946 and 1949 was a crucial factor in the development of the U.S. strategy of containment toward the Soviet Union. The starting point of this process was W. Churchill’s Fulton speech, which – despite the Truman administration’s formal distance from it – fostered a recognition of shared interests. Britain’s withdrawal from providing aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 served as an impetus for the Truman Doctrine, while the U.K.’s participation in implementing the Marshall Plan lent political legitimacy to American assistance amid U.S. expectations that initiative should come from European states themselves. The joint airlift operation during the Berlin Blockade demonstrated the effectiveness of transatlantic security cooperation, culminating in the establishment of NATO on April 4, 1949. The experience of this period shows that the synergy of political leadership, economic resources, and shared values constitutes the cornerstone of effective foreign policy strategies.

Keywords: United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Marshall Plan, Cold War, NATO, international relations.

Submitted 19.09.2025

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