THE U.S. ROLE IN BRITISH-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE SUEZ CANAL, 1945–1954

Olexandr Marushchenko,

Ph D (History), Associate Professor

Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University

Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine

 

Yaroslav Dovhyi,

Master’s Student,

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17721/2524-048X.2025.31.8

 

Abstract. This article examines the role of the United States of America in the British-Egyptian settlement of the Suez Canal dispute in 1945–1954. To this end, the authors analyzed the perception of the strategic importance of the military base on the Suez Canal for both the United Kingdom and the United States and identified the differences between them. Furthermore, the article explores efforts to establish a unified position between the two nations regarding an agreement with Egypt. To this end, the reasons for the US refusal to support the British version of the Suez Canal settlement of the British-Egyptian disagreements are considered.

Therefore, the purpose of the article is to examine the role of the United States in the British-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez Canal military base through a comprehensive analysis of the US and UK policies towards Egypt.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in its examination of the participation of the United States in the British-Egyptian negotiations and its contribution to the conclusion of the British-Egyptian agreement of July 28, 1954, on the status of the military base on the Suez Canal.

Methodology. To conduct a qualitative study and obtain reliable results, we used several general scientific and specific historical methods. Among the general scientific methods, we used the method of analysis. The method of analysis was used to identify the distinguishing qualities of attempts at settling on a common US-British position in negotiations with Egypt. Among the special historical methods were used historical and genetic – to trace the evolution of the US position on Egypt’s mandatory participation in the Middle East defense organization; historical and comparative – to establish the particularities of the position of the United Kingdom and the United States towards the strategic status of the military base in the Suez Canal.

Conclusions. It is determined that the Suez Canal was of strategic importance to the United Kingdom as a key link in the empire and as well as a military and logistics facility, as well as the last symbol of colonial power. The United States, on the other hand, considered the security of the Middle East’s oil fields as a priority, giving preference to other countries in the region. It is established that the aggravation of British-Egyptian relations in the 1950s complicated the West’s plans for regional security, and London’s tough stance on maintaining a military presence in the Suez Canal did not correspond with the US strategy. It is shown that the United States, realizing the risk of Egypt’s rapprochement with the USSR, did not support British proposals for resolving the conflict. As a result, the United Kingdom lost the support of its key ally, which forced it to agree to withdraw. It is found that the United States aspired to adapt the new world order to the needs of the anti-colonial nationalist movements, guaranteeing regional stability without a direct military presence in peacetime. Thus, the contribution of the United States to resolving the conflict was decisive, though it caused tensions with the United Kingdom. However, it subsequently assisted in consolidating the West’s stance on Egypt before the Suez crisis. 

Keywords: United States, United Kingdom, Egypt, Suez Canal, international relations, «soft power», «strategic depth».

 

Submitted 07.01.2025

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